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RING LEARNING WITH ERRORS: A CROSSROADS
BETWEEN POSTQUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY, MACHINE
LEARNING AND NUMBER THEORY
IVA´N BLANCO-CHACO´N
Abstract. The present survey reports on the state of the art of the different
cryptographic functionalities built upon the ring learning with errors problem
and its interplay with several classical problems in algebraic number theory.
The survey is based to a certain extent on an invited course given by the
author at the Basque Center for Applied Mathematics in September 2018.
1. Introduction
According to MIRACL Labs, it is estimated that a quantum computer capable
of breaking most of modern cryptography will be built in the next 10-15 years
(20-25 years according to Microsoft Research). All of cryptography is built on
supposedly hard mathematical problems, most of which, like integer factorisation
or the discrete logarithm problem, become relatively easy in the context of a
working quantum computer. In response to this threat there is a need to migrate
from these vulnerable constructs to constructs known to remain strong even in a
post-quantum world.
An example of such a hard problem is the shortest vector problem in a lattice,
which is known to be NP-hard. While there already exist post-quantum solu-
tions for much of standard cryptography, like public key encryption and digital
signature, it is currently unclear how some of the more elaborate protocols, like
those seeking for integrity or non-repudiation can be successfully migrated. In
particular in the last 10+ years bilinear pairings on elliptic curves have opened
up many new possibilities, which will unfortunately be rendered insecure in a
post-quantum world. Already commercial products based on bilinear pairings
have found applications in the ‘real world’, and so much work must be done to
ensure that we will be able to retain this functionality into the future.
Partially supported by Science Foundation Ireland 13/IA/1914 and MTM2016-79400.
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At the same time there is much fundamental work to be done on the post-
quantum primitives themselves. Indeed an early decision is to choose between
one or various of the following technologies, for each cryptographic feature:
a) Code based cryptography ([16]) is built on the infeasibility of syndrome
decoding for general linear error-correcting codes over finite fields.
b) Multivariate based cryptography ([6]) is a scheme based on the fact that
solving general systems of multivariate polynomial equations over finite
fields is proved to be NP-hard.
c) Isogeny based cryptography ([9]), is a protocol for key exchange, analo-
gous to Diffie-Hellman, but the cyclic groups present here are attached to
supersingular elliptic curves defined over finite field.
d) Finally, lattice based cryptography, admits a large number of different
formulations and constructions. This report focuses on one of the most
promising lattice-based technologies: Ring LearningWith Errors (RLWE).
This scheme is based on the RLWE problem, which is based in turn on the
difficulty of solving the shortest vector problem (SVP) on ideal lattices.
At the time of writing, code, lattice and multivariate-based methods seem to
be the strongest contenders, as they appear to have the flexible structure needed
on which to base more complex protocols. Within these three categories, the
lattice-based one has by far a larger number of non-broken primitives/protocols.
Lattice based cryptography has a relatively mature history, primarily due to the
work done by the early proponents of the related NTRU cryptosystem ([12]).
This was a patented technology which enjoyed some minor success, but never
really gained traction, as when it was invented, a quantum computer still seemed
very far off. Its patents have now expired.
RLWE first came to prominence with the paper by Lyubashevsky, Peikert and
Regev ([14]). A key-exchange algorithm proposed by them was recently optimized
and implemented by Alkim, Ducas, Po¨ppelmann, and Schwabe ([1]). This was
then implemented by Google in a well-publicised experiment ([3]). In recent
times there have been many implementation improvements, see for example the
recent paper by Scott ([20]). So there can be no doubting the practicality of
the technology, opinions supporting this view include those of a good number of
researchers in Intel Labs and MIRACL Labs.
RLWE is built on an earlier scheme: the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem,
which admits a security reduction from the SVP on arbitrary lattices, proved to
be NP-hard. The disadvantage is a quadratic overhead in the key sizes, which is
unfeasible in practice but is overcome in the RLWE scenario, at the cost of being
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backed in the SVP over just ideal lattices, which even if based on experience is
widely believed to be intractable, there is no proof of it at the moment. In spite of
that, RLWE variant appears to be eminently practical. While, in common with
most post-quantum proposals, the key sizes are much larger than those of existing
methods, they often require much less computing power. For example while an
elliptic curve based cryptosystem might use keys of 256 bits, an equivalent system
based on RLWE might require keys of 4096 bits, while running maybe 10-100
times faster ([13]). These differences might be seen as balancing each other out.
Likewise, 30% of the surviving proposals for the NIST are based of RLWE.
Our report is structured as follows:
In section 2 we provide a quick introduction to the different funtionalities of
cryptography and introduce the main terms and facts on complexity as they show
up in the literature. We provide several examples, elaborating on those presented
in the course by the author.
In section 3 we expose the main concepts of lattice-based cryptography. We
focus on the classical LWE, over which RLWE is built and discuss its advanteges
and drawbacks.
Section 4 is an quick overview of a few key concepts in algebraic number theory:
rings of integers, canonical embedding, and other topics. These pieces will make
the foundations of RLWE, but the reader who is familiar with this material can
safely skip it.
Section 5 introduces the RLWE problem in its various formulations and re-
ports on several attacks to the scheme, which motivate some number theoretical
problems and conjectures.
Section 6 addresses RLWE-based digital signatures and homomorphic encryp-
tion, a functionality which is gaining much interest today, since it allows to solve
a good number of logistic and security problems in cloud computing and storing.
We close the survey by discussing in detail some NIST figures.
A couple of remarks to end this introduction: first, by a polynomial time
algorithm we mean an algorithm for which there exists a polynomial p(x) ∈ R[x]
and a size function of the family of the algorithm inputs x(n), such that the time
it takes to run the algorithm on input n is p(x(n)). Second, we will use sometimes
the O˜-notation: a function f(x) is O˜(g(x)) if it is O(g(x)logk(x)) for some k.
Acknowledgements: The author thanks Gary McGuire for carefully reading
a preliminary version of this survey, to Mike Scott for providing most of the
practical highlights on RLWE and to the Basque Center for Applied Mathematics
for their invitation to give this course. Active and insightful discussion with the
audience of the course, and in particular with Sebastia´ Xambo´ set the author to
write this work.
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2. Post-quantum cryptography
2.1. Cryptography features. Requirements such as confidentiality and proofs
of identity are crucial in electronic financial and legal transactions, while some
other features like non-repudiation or operating on encrypted data (homomorphic
encryption) are gaining much traction within the last few years. We examine here
most of these functionalities.
The best known cryptographic problem is confidentiality. This is attained by
the use of well-designed encryption/decription schemes.
To start with, we fix a finite alphabet A, with some methematical structure
such as an abelian group or a field (e.g. the finite field Fq for q = p
t and p prime, or
an elliptic curve over this field). We consider three sets K ⊂ An (keys), M⊂ AN
(plaintexts) and C ⊂ AN (ciphertexts) with n ≪ N . Finally, we consider a set
Λ ⊂ N which parametrizes the level of security, i.e., the larger λ ∈ Λ, the safer
the scheme.
Definition 2.1 (Cipher schemes). A cipher over (K,M, C) is a family of pairs of
efficiently computable functions {(Eλ,Dλ)}λ∈Λ where for each λ, Eλ : K×M→ C
(encryption function) and Dλ : K × C →M (decryption function) are such that
for each key k ∈ K and for each plaintext m ∈ M, the following correctness
property holds:
Dλ(k,Eλ(k,m)) = m.
That is to say, decryption undoes encryption.
Efficiently computable means that both Eλ and Dλ can be computed by an
algorithm which is polynomial in the security parameter λ, i.e., there exist polyno-
mials p(x), q(x) ∈ R[x] only depending on the scheme, such that for each λ ∈ Λ,
k ∈ K, m ∈ M, and c ∈ C, the number of steps to compute Eλ(k,m) (resp.
Dλ(k, c)) is upper bounded by p(λ) (resp. q(λ)). Moreover, the algorithm for Eλ
can be probabilistic, while Dλ should always be deterministic.
Since in our definition both the encryption and decryption parties have the
same key (i.e., the scheme is symmetric), they should agree beforehand on that
key somehow. For instance, they might do it physically in a secret meeting but
they can also use a digital key exchange protocol. As usual, any arbitrary legiti-
mate sender (receiver) will be called Alice (Bob), and any arbitrary eavesdropper
will be called Eve.
Definition 2.2 (Key exchange protocol). A key exchange protocol is an efficient
method for Alice and Bob to agree on a key through a (potentially non-safe)
channel. One of the most famous protocols is Diffie-Hellman’s (DH), where Alice
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and Bob start by agreeing on a finite feld Fq and a primitive root g, made public.
To agree on a private key, Alice selects an integer a and Bob selects an integer b.
Then, Alice sends ga to Bob, who on receiving it, raises it to b modulo q, getting
gab. Next, Bob sends gb to Alice, who raises it to a, obtaining also gab, the agreed
private key.
Notice that without knowledge of a or b, Eve cannot obtain gab from ga and
gb in an efficient manner (on a classic computer!), the obtruction being the un-
feasibility of the discrete logarithm, namely, to obtain a from ga modulo q, if g is
known. Nowadays, a combined usage of Diffie-Hellman (or some variant) with a
suitable symmetric cipher is used in most internet protocols, like TLS or TCP/IP.
A variant of DH is ECDH, where the multiplicative group F∗q is replaced by the
additive group of an elliptic curve over Fq.
Definition 2.3 (Digital signatures). A signature scheme is a pair (G,D), where
G : Λ → K is an efficient key generating probabilistic algorithm, and D =
{(Sλ, Vλ)}λ∈Λ is a family of pairs of polynomial-random-algorithm-computable
functions Sλ : K ×M → T ⊆ Ar (space of tags) and Vλ : K ×M× T → {0, 1}
such that whenever ks (secret key) and kp (public key) are sampled from G on
security level λ, it is, for every message m ∈ M:
pr [Vλ(kp,m, Sλ(ks,m)) = 1] = 1.
For a security level λ, Sλ is called the signature function and Vλ the verification
function, which returns 1 if the signature is valid and 0 otherwise. This scheme
provides a proof that the message was created by a known sender (authentication)
and the sender cannot deny having sent the message (non-repudiation).
Integrated Encryption Schemes implement both encryption and authentica-
tion. Two of the most commonly used are ECIES, which operates with elliptic
curves and DLIES, which operates over Fq.
Example 2.4. If (E,D) is a cipher over (K,M, C), M = C and for each k ∈ K,
E(k, •) and D(k, •) are bijective, we can turn the cipher into a signature scheme
by setting T =M, Sλ = Dλ and
V (k, c,m) =
{
1 if E(k,m) = c
0 otherwise.
Classic designs of digital signature schemes include Rabin’s algorithm, Lamport
schemes and Merkle trees, as well as RSA-based protocols.
6 IVA´N BLANCO-CHACO´N
Definition 2.5 (Homomorphic encryption). Let (E,D) be a cipher over (K,M, C)
whereM and C are abelian groups under the operations ∗M and ∗C respectively.
The cipher is said to be homomorphic if for each key k ∈ K and plaintexts
m1,m2 ∈ M, it is
E(k,m1) ∗C E(k,m2) = E(k,m1 ∗M m2).
Example 2.6. RSA encryption is homomorphic. Indeed, for an RSA integer
N = pq > 1 and an exponent e modulo φ(N) with inverse d, encryption goes as
x 7→ xe (mod N), which clearly commutes with the product modulo N , but not
with the sum.
When in addition,M and C have ring structure and encryption commutes with
both ring operations, the cipher is said to be fully homomorphic (FHE). Notice
that RSA is not fully homomorphic.
Homomorphic encryption allows to perform operations on the plaintext by
operating directly on the ciphertexts, i.e., without decrypting first. This is rel-
evant when the operations are outsourced and performed over a non-trustable
server. Applications of homomorphic encryption include encrypted database
queries, cloud computing, genetic computing, health data management or out-
sourced generation of blockchain addresses.
2.2. P, NP, NP-hard and NP-complete. The author has often seen that the
terms intractable, unfeasible, and hard, are used in the post-quantum cryptogra-
phy literature in a rather loose (at best!) manner and this may lead to believe
that certain computational problems enjoy certain complexity guarantees that
they simply have not. We make here precise the main terms that will appear in
the problems which back lattice cryptography.
Definition 2.7 (The P and NP classes). The P class consists of the decission
problems whose solution can be found on a deterministic Turing machine in
polynomial time in the input size. The NP class consists of the decission problems
for which a putative solution can be checked to be a real solution or not in
polynomial time on a determnistic Turing machine.
Equivalently, the NP-class consists of the decission problems such that a solu-
tion can be found in polynomial time on a non-deterministic Turing machine. A
common misconception is that the NP term in NP-hard stands for non-polynomial
when in fact it stands for non-deterministic polynomial acceptable problems.
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Definition 2.8 (reduction). We say that a problem A admits a reduction to
a problem B if any instance of A can be transformed to an instance of B in
polynomial time, namely, if solving B suffices for solving A.
Informally, NP-hard and NP-complete problems are those at least as hard as
those in the NP-class, but while NP-complete problems belong to NP, NP-hard
ones need not to, hence NP-hard problems can be regarded as more intractable
than NP-complete ones. More precisely:
Definition 2.9. The NP-hard class consists of those problems A such that every
problem in NP can be reduced to A in polynomial time. The NP-complete class
consists of those NP problems which are NP-hard.
Example 2.10. In a major breakthrough, Agrawal, Kayal and Saxena proved
that primality testing, i.e., deciding whether a positive integer is prime or not is
a P problem.
More relevant to cryptographers, the celebrated Shor’s algorithm solves the
factoring problem (i.e. finds the prime factorisation of a positive integer) in
polynomial time on a quantum computer. This does not mean that this problem is
in the P-class, as a (probabilistic) quantum algorithm is not equivalent, in general,
to a Turing or sequential machine. On the other hand, the prime factorsation
problem is clearly NP: checking if a putative solution (i.e. a prime decomposition)
is a prime factorisation of an integer can be done in (deterministic) polynomial
time. However it is not known if prime factorisation is NP-hard (and hence NP-
complete). It is expected, moreover, not to be in the P class, but as pointed
out before, it can be carried out, with arbitrarily high probability, on a quantum
computer.
To factor a positive integer N , Shor’s algorithm runs over all the integers in
the range {1, .., N}. For 1 < a < N , if a is a unit modulo N , the algorithm
calls a sub-routine to compute the order of a modulo N . With this period, the
algorithm produces a non-trivial factor of N .
The period-finding sub-routine is run on a quantum computer, but the use of
the period to produce a factor is classical.
Example 2.11. There is a polynomial time quantum reduction from the discrete
logarithm problem (DLP) to the the order-finding problem.
Indeed, given A = ga (mod N), use the polynomial time quantum sub-routine
in Shor’s algorithm to find r, the order of A. Second, use Shor’s algorithm to
find φ(N).
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Now, observe that r = φ(N)gcd(a,φ(N)) . Thus, gcd(
ar
φ(N) , r) = 1. Hence, it suffices to
test, for k ≥ 2, if φ(N) | kr (by the Euclidean algorithm), and in that case, also
by the Euclidean algorithm, if krφ(N) is coprime to r. If so, check if g
k = A.
So, a quantum computer would render insecure protocols as RSA and Diffie-
Hellman. Even more, Tate and Weil’s pairings allow to reduce ECDLP to DLP,
hence, symmetric cryptography based on elliptic curves would also be broken in
a post-quantum scenario. This is a reason to consider schemes which use pairing-
free abelian varieties, hence other than elliptic curves. Jacobians of hyperelliptic
curves are known to be good candidates but beyond genus 3, the complexity of
finding explicit equations and explicit computations for the addition law render
them unfeasible.
On the other hand, NP-complete problems are not expected to be solvable
even in a quantum compute, hence NP-hard are neither. However, this is only
conjectural.
Another well-known conjecture is whether P 6= NP or not. If equality held,
all cryptographic (classic and postquantum) primitives based on NP-complete
problems (which are, in particular, NP problems, hence P problems, by the as-
sumed equality) would be useless. On the contrary, if, as it is widely believed,
P 6= NP , then every NP-hard problem would be non-polynomial, hence suitable
for cryptography: indeed, if Λ is NP-hard, in case P 6= NP , take B in NP \ P .
Then Λ cannot be polynomial (otherwise, B would be so).
But for the moment, lacking a proof of P 6= NP , all we can say is that NP-hard
problems are strongly expected to be suitable for (postquantum) cryptography.
3. Lattice based cryptography
The security of lattice-based schemes relies on two NP-hard problems, which
are expected to be intractable on a quantum computer, and which we explain
next. By length, we mean Euclidean length, denoted || ||. By a lattice we
understand, from now on, a finitely generated additive subgroup of Rn. When
the rank of a finitely generated abelian group is n, the lattice is said to have full
rank.
Problem 3.1 (SVP). Let Λ be a full rank lattice in Rn and denote by λ1(Λ)
the length of the shortest non-zero vector. The shortest vector problem (SVP)
is to determine a vector x ∈ Λ with length λ1(Λ). For γ > 0, the γ-approximate
shortest vector problem (γ-SVP) is to determine a non-zero vector x ∈ Λ with
length smaller than γλ1(Λ).
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Problem 3.2 (CVP). Let Λ be a full rank lattice in Rn. The closest vector
problem (CVP) consists in, given y ∈ Rn, to find xy ∈ Λ such that
||y − xy|| = min
x∈Λ
||x− y||.
If Λ is an arbitrary lattice, i.e., if no extra condition is imposed on it, in [2]
(resp. in [15]) it is proved that CVP (resp. SVP) is NP-hard. Hence, if P 6= NP ,
these two problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, even with the aid of a
quantum computer.
3.1. Learning with errors (LWE). Let q be a rational prime for which a
suitable choice will be made later. A provably quantum-secure instantiation of
lattice-based cryptography relies on the LWE problem, which we describe in this
subsection.
Definition 3.3 (LWE-oracles). Let χ be a discrete random variable χ with values
over Fq. For s ∈ Fnq , chosen uniformly at random, a LWE-oracle with respect to
s and χ, denoted Aχ,s, is a probabilistic algorithm As,χ which, at each execution,
performs the following steps:
1. Samples a vector a uniformly at random from Fnq .
2. Computes the scalar product 〈a, s〉.
3. Samples e ∈ Fq from χ.
4. Outputs the vector [a, 〈a, s〉+ e] ∈ Fnq × Fq.
Definition 3.4 (The LWE problem). Let χ be a discrete random variable with
values in Fq as before. The LWE problem for χ and q is defined as follows:
a) Search version: for an element s ∈ Fnq chosen uniformly at random and
a LWE-oracle As,χ, if an adversary is given access to arbitrarily many
samples [a, 〈a, s〉+ e] of the LWE distribution, this adversary must recover
s.
a) Decisional version: for an element s ∈ Fnq chosen uniformly at random
and a LWE oracle As,χ, the adversary is asked to distinguish, with non-
negligible advantage, between arbitrarily many samples from As,χ and
the same number of samples (ai, bi) ∈ Fnq ×Fq where ai and bi are chosen
independently and uniformly at random from Fnq and Fq.
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From now on, χ will be a discrete Gaussian variable values on Fq, which is
defined as follows: For σ, c ∈ R we set ρσ,c(x) = exp −(x−c)
2
2σ2
. Write
Sσ,c = ρσ,c(Z) =
∞∑
k=−∞
ρσ,c(k),
and define Dσ,c to be the distribution on Z such that the probability of x ∈ Z
is ρσ,c(x)/Sσ,c. Finally, the discrete Gaussian distribution χ with values in Fq,
mean 0, and parameter σ is defined by the probability function
Pr [χ = k] =
∑
n≡k (mod q)
pr [Dσ,0 = n] .
Some words of caution: first, the variance of χ is close to σ2, but is not exactly
σ2, in lattice-based cryptography what is relevant is the parameter σ, rather
than the variance. Second, the discrete Gaussian over Z is more complicated
than truncating a continuous Gaussian to its closest integer. Effective sampling
from discrete Gaussian distributions is a major topic and in practical cases it is
approached only by numerical approximation. The reader is referred to [7] for
a formal discussion as well as for generalisations to lattices in Rn, which will be
used in next chapters.
In the Machine Learning terminology, an algorithm which solves the search
version of LWE is a training algorithm using the collection of LWE samples
as a training set. On the other hand, Regev found in [18] a polynomial time
quantum reduction from the SVP problem to the LWE problem. This means
that a training algorithm A for the LWE problem can be turned, in polynomial
time (on a quantum computer), into an algorithm B (of the same complexity
as A) which solves the SVP problem. Since we have seen before that the SVP
problem is NP-hard, it follows that the LWE problem is also NP-hard.
Based on this hardness guarantee, the LWE problem can be used to build the
following cryptosystem:
Construction 3.5 (LWE cryptosystem, Regev ([18])).
1. Parameters: n,m ∈ N, α > 0.
2. Private key: s ∈ Fnq chosen uniformly at random.
3. Public key:
3.1 Sample a1, ..., am ∈ Fnq , independently and uniformly at random.
3.2 Sample e1, ..., em ∈ Fq, independently from χ, which is assumed here
to be a discrete Gaussian of zero mean and parameter αq2pi .
3.3 Publish {[ai, bi = 〈ai, s〉+ ei]}mi=1.
4. Encryption: for a bit z ∈ F2, consider it as an element of Fq by mapping
the 0 and 1 of F2 to the 0 and 1 of Fq. Select a random subset S ⊆
RING LEARNING WITH ERRORS 11
{1, ...,m} and map
z 7→ [u, v] =
[∑
i∈S
ai, z⌊q
2
⌋+
∑
i∈S
bi
]
.
5. Decryption: on receiving an encrypted message [u, v], compute d := v −
〈u, s〉. This equals z⌊ q2⌋ +
∑
i∈S ei.Hence, divide d by ⌊ q2⌋. For suitable
choice of α, the remainder has absolute value below z⌊ q4⌋, so decrytption
is just the quotient of the division of d by ⌊ q2⌋ (with huge probability).
The right choice of q, m and α is given in the following result, whose proof is
omited since it is very similar to the cryptographic scheme presented in the next
subsection, whose proof we provide.
Theorem 3.6. If q ∈ {n2, ..., 2n2}, α = 1√
n log2(n)
and m is of the order of
1.1n log(q), then the LWE cryptosystem is correct and pseudorandom.
As we can see, a public key for LWE has m vectors in Fnq , since m is of
the order of n log(n), it turns out that a public key has an Fq-size of the order
n2 log(n). This quadratic overhead is an unfeasible constrain from a practical
point of view, in particular in settings such as hand-held digital broadcasting,
mobile encryption and small devices in future applications of the IoT (Internet of
Things), where the hardware has a relatively small memory. A variation of the
LWE problem, the ring learning with errors (RLWE) problem was introduced to
tackle this quadratic overhead. The foundations of the problem require several
notions from algebraic number theory, which we present next.
4. Some basics of algebraic number theory
Here we present the notions of algebraic number theory used to build the
RLWE cryptosystem. Readers who are familiar with them can easily skip this
section, while readers who are not are referred to [21], Chapter 2 for more details.
4.1. Algebraic number fields. A number field is a field extension K = Q(θ)/Q
of finite degree n, where θ satisfies a relation f(θ) = 0 for some irreducible poly-
nomial f(x) ∈ Q[x], which is monic without loss of generality. The polynomial f
is called the minimal polynomial of θ, and n is also the degree of f . Notice that
K is in particular an n-dimensional Q-vector space and the set {1, θ, ..., θn−1}
is a Q-basis of K called the power basis. Notice that associating θ with the
indeterminate x yields a natural isomorphism between K and Q[x]/f(x).
I.e. statistically indistinguishable from a uniform distribution
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A number field K = Q(θ) of degree n has exactly n field embeddings (injective
field homomorphisms) fixing the base field Q, which we denote σi : K → C. These
embeddings map θ to each of the complex roots of its minimal polynomial f . An
embedding whose image lies in R(corresponding to a real root of f) is called a
real embedding; otherwise it is called a complex embedding. Since complex roots
of f come in conjugate pairs, so do the complex embeddings. The number of
real embeddings is denoted s1 and the number of pairs of complex embeddings is
denoted s2, so we have n = s1+2s2. The canonical embedding σ : K → Rs1×C2s2
is then defined as
σ(x) = (σ1(x), ..., σn(x)).
Note that σ is a field homomorphism from K to Rs1 ×C2s2 , where multiplication
and addition in the latter are both component-wise.
4.2. Algebraic integers. An algebraic integer is an element whose minimal
polynomial over Q has integer coefficients. For a number field K of degree n,
let OK ⊂ K denote the set of all algebraic integers in K. This set forms a ring
(under addition and multiplication in K), called the ring of integers of K. It
happens that OK is a free Z-module of rank n, i.e., it is the set of all Z-linear
combinations of some basis B = {b1, ..., bn} ⊂ OK of K. Such a set B is called
an integral basis.
Example 4.1. Let m > 1 be an integer. The set of primitive m-th roots of unity
(those of the form θk = exp(2πi)k/m, with 1 ≤ k ≤ m coprime to m) forms a
multiplicative group of order n = φ(m). The m-th cyclotomic polynomial is
Φm(x) =
∏
k∈Z∗
m
(x− θk).
This is the minimal polynomial of θk for each k, so that K = Q(θk) is an algebraic
number field of degree n. It can be proved ([21] Chap 3) that the ring of integers
of K is precisely Z[θk].
Example 4.2. Let d be a square-free integer. Consider the number field Q(
√
d).
It can be shown that the ring of integers of K is Z[
√
d] if d 6≡ 1 (mod 4) and
Z[1+
√
d
2 ] otherwise.
Definition 4.3 (The discriminant). Let K be a number field of degree n, and
OK its ring of integers. The discriminant of K, denoted ∆K is the square of the
determinant of the following matrix:

σ1(θ1) ... σn(θ1)
...
. . .
...
σ1(θn) ... σn(θn)

 ,
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where {θ1, ...θn} is a Z-basis of OK . Notice that since lattice base-change matrices
are unimodular, the definition does not depend on the choice of the basis.
4.3. Ideals and ideal lattices. Recall that an ideal of a ring R is an additive
subgroup I ⊆ R such that for each α ∈ R and each β ∈ I, it is αβ ∈ I.
For instance, for d ≡ 1 (mod 4), the subring Z[√d] is not an ideal of the ring
of integers, just a subring with finite index.
If R is discrete, for an embedding σ : R → Rn, σ(R) is a lattice. An ideal
lattice for the pair (R,σ) is the image σ(I) for I an ideal of R. When R = OK
for a number field K of degree n, the canonical embedding σ provides in a natural
way an ideal lattice for each ideal I of R. Notice that the square root of ∆K is
the volume of the fundamental parallelogram of the lattice σ(OK). From now
on, by ideal embeddings we will mean with respect to the canonical embedding.
Notice that for the canonical embedding, multiplication and addition are pre-
served component-wise. For instance, for the ring Z[x]/(xn + 1), the coordinate
embedding does not preserve addition and multiplication component-wise: mul-
tiplying by x, for instance, is equivalent to shifting the coordinates and negate
the independent term. This is one of the advantages of using the canonical em-
bedding.
5. Ring learning with errors in its several variants
5.1. Statement of the problems. To define the ring learning with errors (RLWE)
problem, let K be a number field of degree n and ring of integers OK . By using
the canonical embedding we can regard it as a full rank lattice.
A closely related (and equivalent under some conditions) problem is the poly-
nomial learning with errors problem (PLWE). To define it, we start with a monic
irreducible polynomial f(x) ∈ Z[x] and consider the ring Z[x]/(f(x)). Notice that
the polynomial defines a number field Kα = Q(α) for each root α of f(x) and
all of them are Q-isomorphic. Moreover, the ring Z[α] is a finite-index sub-order
of the ring of integers OKα . The restriction of the canonical embedding to this
suborder provides also a lattice. A very common choice is f(x) = xn + 1, where
n = 2k, which is the 2k+1-th cyclotomic polynomial.
Let q be a rational prime which we will choose later.
Definition 5.1 (RLWE and PLWE-oracles).
1. Set R = OK and Rq = R/qR. Fix also a discrete random variable χ with
values in R. For s ∈ Rq, chosen uniformly at random, a RLWE-oracle
with respect to s and χ is a probabilistic algorithm As,χ which, at each
execution performs the following steps:
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1. Samples an element a ∈ Rq uniformly at random,
2. Samples an element e from χ and computes e˜ := e (mod qRq),
3. Outputs the pair (a, as + e˜) ∈ Rq ×Rq.
2. For a monic irreducible polynomial f ∈ Z[x], set R = Z[x]/(f(x)) and
Rq = R/qR. Fix also a discrete random variable χ with values in R.
For s ∈ Rq, chosen uniformly at random, a PLWE-oracle with respect to
s and χ is a probabilistic algorithm As,χ which, does exactly the same
steps as an RLWE-oracle, but with the difference that Rq is now a quotient
polynomial ring instead of the quotient of a ring of integers.
Definition 5.2 (The RLWE problem). Set R = OK and Rq = R/qR as before.
Let χ be a discrete random variable with values in R. The RLWE-problem for χ
is defined as follows:
a) Search version: for an element s ∈ Rq chosen uniformly at random and
a RLWE-oracle As,χ, if an adversary is given access to arbitrarily many
samples (ai, ais + e˜i) of the RLWE distribution, this adversary must re-
cover s.
a) Decisional version: for an element s ∈ R chosen uniformly at random
and a RLWE-oracle As,χ, the adversary is asked to distinguish, with non-
negligible advantage, between arbitrarily many samples from As,χ and
the same number of samples (ai, bi) where ai, bi are chosen uniformly at
randon from Rq.
If we set R = Z[x]/(f(x)) instead of OK , we have the analogous definitions for
the PLWE problem in its search and decisional versions.
Some words on the class of distributions we will use from now on. Notice
that one RLWE sample is an n-tuple of coordinates with values in Fq, but it is
something more than n LWE samples (Rq is not only an Fq- vector space, but has
also a ring structure). This is the reason why instead of taking n-independent
discrete Fq-valued Gaussians, we rather use an F
n
q -valued Gaussian. As in the
1-dimensional case, the mean will also be 0 and the variance-covariance matrix
(or rather, the multidmensional parameter) will be chosen to be diagonal (which
is referred to as saying that the distribution is elliptic). This is useful when
carrying out the security-reduction proofs. Moreover, it is enough for most of
the proofs to assume that the diagonal elements of the covariance matrix are
bounded in absolute value by αn1/4, for α a parameter which will be made explicit
in the next theorem. Hence, from now on, we assume that χα is an elliptic n-
dimensional Gaussian of 0-mean and the elements of the diagonal are bounded
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as explained. The details are delicate and can be omited in a first study, since
the aforementioned bound is what really matters for most proofs, but the reader
is referred to [14], p. 19 for more information.
The next result backs the security of the decisional RLWE-problem (hence of
the search RLWE-problem) in the security of the SVP over ideal lattices.
Theorem 5.3 ([14], page 19). Let K be the m-th cyclotomic number field of
degree n = φ(m) and R = OK its ring of integers. Let α <
√
log n/n and let
q = q(n) ≥ 2, q ≡ 1 (mod m) be a prime bounded by a polynomial in n such that
αq ≥ ω(√log n). There is a polynomial time quantum reduction from O˜(√n/α)-
SVP on ideal lattices of K to the decisional RLWE problem for K and χα.
The proof consists of two parts: the first is a quantum reduction from worst
case approximate SVP on ideal lattices to the search version of RLWE. The
reduction works in general, not for just cyclotomic number fields. It uses the
iterative quantum reduction for general lattices in [18] as a black box, the main
effort being the classical (non-quantum) part, which requires a careful handling
of the canonical embedding and the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
The second part shows that the RLWE distribution is pseudorandom via a
classical reduction from the search version, which has been shown hard in the
first part. It uses the fact that the cyclotomic field is Galois and the fact that
q ≡ 1 (mod n), which ensures that the ideal qR splits totally into n ideals in R.
In [17] Theorem 6.2, the authors build on the same number-theoretical kind
of arguments as in [14] to prove an analogue of 5.3 for non-cyclotomic Galois
number fields.
As pointed out before, for the cyclotomic number field, the ring of integers
satisfies OK = Z[ζ], with ζ a primitivee m-th root of unity. Since this ring
is isomorphic to Z[x]/(Φm(x)), with Φm(x) the m-th cyclotomic polynomial, it
easily follows that both the RLWE and PLWE problems are equivalent each other.
For number fields other than cyclotomic, all we can say at the time of writing is
the following:
Theorem 5.4. There is a polynomial quantum reduction algorithm from decision
(resp search) RLWE in K to decision (resp. search) PLWE for f(x), where K
is the splitting field of f(x), for an infinite family of polynomials, in particular
for the family xn + xp(x) − r where n ≥ 1, p(x) runs over polynomials with
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deg(p(x)) < n/2 and r runs over primes such that 25||p||21 ≤ r ≤ s(n), with s(x)
a polynomial. Notice that there is a trivial reduction from PLWE to RLWE.
To close the picture, the following result is also true:
Theorem 5.5 ([19]). For an arbitrary Galois number field K, there is a quantum
reduction algorithm from search RLWE in K to decision RLWE.
5.2. The LPR (Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev) RLWE-cryptosystem.
Both RLWE and PLWE problems can be turned into public key cryptosystems,
as we show next. We will focus in the PLWE version, which is more suitable
for computer implementations, i.e., we will set R = Z[x]/(f(x)) for a monic ir-
reducible f(x) ∈ Z[x] and q a prime. Notice that the ring Rq is, as a ring,
isomorphic to Ftq for suitable t depending on the splitting type of of q in the
corresponding ring of integers.
As said in the former subsection, the parameter of χα is upper bounded entry-
wise by αn1/4, and α is chosen to be less than
√
log(n)
n and q = q(n) as in 5.3. Take
n big enough so that the variance of χα is close enough to its parameter and such
that 3log(n)√
n
< q4 (this will be used to grant the correctness of the cryptosystem).
Construction 5.6 (The RLWE cryptosystem).
1. Key generation: choose a ∈ Rq uniformly at random and choose s, e
sampled from χ and reduced modulo q. The secret key will be s and the
public key will be the pair (a, b = as+ e).
2. Encryption: take a plaintext z consisting of a stream of bits and regard
it as a polynomial in Rq, mapping each bit to a coefficient, say, z ∈ Rq.
Choose r, e1, e2 sampled from χ and reduced modulo q. Set u = ar + e1
and v = br + e2 + ⌊ q2⌋z.
3. Decryption: Perform v−us = er+e2−e1s+⌊ q2⌋z and round the coefficients
either to zero or to ⌊ q2⌋, whichever is closest mod q.
Proposition 5.7. The PLWE cryptosystem is correct (i.e. decryption undoes
encryption) and pseudorandom.
Proof. For correctness, notice that for the chosen values of α, q and n, with
arbitrarily large probability, the value er+e2−e1s will have magnitude less than
For p(x) =
n∑
i=0
pix
i ∈ R[x], the 1-norm is defined as ||p||1 =
n∑
i=0
|pi|
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3 log(n)q/n < q/4, so the bits of z can be recovered by dividing v − us by ⌊q/2⌋,
dismissing the reminder, and decrypting, bit by bit, to this quotient.
For pseudorandomness, first note that RLWE samples are pseudorandom even
when s is sampled from χα, by a transformation to the Hermite normal form.
Therefore, public keys (a, b) are pseudorandom and we can replace them by a
uniform pair in R2q . The observations of a passive adversary are (a, u) and (b, v)
which are also pseudorandom, since r is also sampled from χα. 
5.3. Attacks on RLWE. A detailed report on the state of the art of attacks
on the RLWE cryptosystem can be found in [8], where the authors discuss a list
of open questions in algebraic number theory motivated by this cryptosystem.
This interplay between applied and pure number theory constitutes a fruitful
link which is expected to motivate a flow of results from each direction to the
other. We present here only a few of these attacks and questions, working out
some details. Within this subsection, we assume that K is a number field of
degree n, and in the PLWE setting, that the defining polynomial f(x) splits
totally over Fq[x]. This is unnecessary but it will simplify the exposition, while
keeping the essential facts.
A first fact to mention is that at the time of writing, there is no direct attack
against RLWE, i.e., without a reduction to an attack on PLWE, other than
general attacks against arbitrary lattices , using bounded distance decoders. This
topic is under research by the author of this survey. So, all the attacks presented
here attemp at breaking PLWE first and then to reduce RLWE to PLWE.
Theorem 5.8 (Elias et al. [8]). If K satisfies the following six conditions, there
is a polynomial time attack to the search version of the associated RLWE scheme:
1. K = Q(β) is Galois of degree n.
2. The ideal (q) splits totally in OK .
3. K is monogenic, i.e, OK = Z[β].
4. The transformation between the canonical embedding of K and the power
basis representation of K is given by a scaled orthogonal matrix.
5. If f is the minimal polynomial of β, then f(1) ≡ 0 (mod q) .
6. The prime q can be chosen suitably large.
The first two conditions are sufficient for the RLWE search-to-decision reduc-
tion in the case where q ∤ [OK : Z[α]], which is implied by the third condition. The
third and fourth conditions are sufficient for the RLWE-to-PLWE reduction; and
the last two conditions are sufficient for the attack on PLWE. Unfortunately (for
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the attacker’s point of view), it is difficult to construct number fields satisfying
all six conditions simultaneously.
Next, we explain the attack on PLWE if 5 and 6 hold.
Setting as usualR = Z[x]/(f(x)) andRq = R/qR, fix a public key (a(x), b(x)) ∈
Rq×Rq and a secret key s(x) ∈ Rq, i.e b(x) = a(x)s(x)+ e(x) with e(x) sampled
from the discrete Gaussian and reduced modulo q.
For each root α ∈ Fq of f(x), consider the projection πα : Rq → Fq given by
p(x) 7→ p(α). By short vector in Rq we refer to those with small coefficients,
which in practice means that these are upper bounded, in absolute value, by
q/4. For suitable parameter, these short vectors lie inside a prescribed region
with non-negligible probability and are easy to recognise. However, for a pair
(a(x), b(x)), it is difficult to check if it exists r(x) and a short vector e(x) such that
b(x) = a(x)r(x) + e(x), in which case the attacker would guess that s(x) = r(x).
The reason is that there are qn possibilities for s(x) to test, which is prohibitive.
By contrast, in a small ring like Fq, it is easy to examine the possibilities for
s(α) exhaustively: we can loop through the possibilities for s(α), obtaining for
each the putative value e(α) = b(α)−a(α)s(α). The Decision Problem for PLWE,
then, is solved as soon as we can recognize the set of e(α) that arise from the
Gaussian with high probability.
Again, this is difficult in general, but if 5 holds, i.e., if α = 1 is a root of f(x),
the attacker has a chance:
Let us denote by S ⊆ Rq the subset of polynomials that are produced by
the Gaussian with non-negligible probability. This is a small set, due to the
parameter choice. However, Fq is also a much smaller set than Rq and one
expects that generically, πα(S) = Fq or something very close. One says that in
this case S smears across all of Fq.
But we are supposing that α = 1. The polynomials g(x) ∈ S have small
coefficients, and hence have small images g(1) ∈ Fq. This is simply because n
is much smaller than q, due to 6, so that the sum of n small coefficients is still
small modulo q.These ideas can be turned into the following algorithm:
Algorithm 5.9. Suppose f(1) ≡ 0 (mod q). The input is a collection of pairs
{(ai(x), bi(x)) ∈ Rq ×Rq}mi=1, where each sample is drawn either uniformly at
random or from the PLWE distribution . The output is to decide, for each sample,
from which distribution is taken, with non-negligible probability. The algorithm
is as follows:
1 For i = 1 to m do
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Set S = Fq; This is the first guess for π1(S), which will be updated after
each iteration.
2 For each s ∈ S do
2.1 Compute ei := bi(1)− sai(1);
2.2 If ei is not small in absolute value modulo q, then conclude that the
sample cannot be valid for s with nonnegligible probability, and update
S = S \ {s};
Next s;
3 If S = ∅, conclude that the sample was random, otherwise declare the
sample as valid;
Next i;
Remark 5.10. Notice that in the inner loop, if the sample is valid, then ei =
ei(1) =
n∑
j=1
eij , and if σ is the variance of χ (which is spherical with respect to
our embedding, fixed beforehand), then, ei is sampled from a discrete Gaussian
distribution of zero mean and parameter
√
nσ. The region of non-negligible
probability for this Gaussian, say, nσ2 ≪ q makes a sensible guess for the set S.
Notice that the cyclotomic cases are protected against this attack: α = 1 is
never a root modulo q of a cyclotomic polynomial of degree greater than 1 when
q is sufficiently large. However, with minor modifications, it is possible to extend
the former attack to the case where α small order modulo q. Indeed, denote by r
the order of αmodulo q. For a polynomial e(x), to decide if e(α) is sampled from a
Gaussian distribution in a similar fashion as in Remark 5.10 is more complicated.
However, one can still take advantage of a small r, as we explain next.
For e(x) =
n∑
i=0
eix
i, set n = rM + l with 0 ≤ l ≤ r − 1. Define aMr+k = 0 for
0 ≤ k 6= l ≤ r − 1 and write
e(α) =
r−1∑
i=0
M∑
j=0
ejr+iα
i.
If e(x) is sampled from a Gaussian with variance σ2, then each term
∑M
j=0 ejr+i
is sampled from a 1-dmensional Gaussian of variance (M + 1)σ2. This defines a
smallness region Λ ⊂ Fq to look at in order to guess tentative values of πα(e(x)).
With this observation, we can derive the following algorithm:
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Algorithm 5.11. Suppose f(α) ≡ 0 (mod q). The input is a collection of pairs
{(ai(x), bi(x)) ∈ Rq ×Rq}mi=1, where each sample is drawn either uniformly at
random or from the PLWE distribution . The output is to decide, for each sample,
from which distribution is taken, with non-negligible probability. The algorithm
is as follows:
1 For i = 1 to m do
Set S = Fq;
2 For each s ∈ S do
2.1 Compute ei := bi(α) − sai(α);
2.2 If ei 6∈ Λ, then conclude that the sample cannot be valid for s with
nonnegligible probability, and update S = S \ {s};
Next s;
3 If S = ∅, conclude that the sample was random, otherwise declare the
sample as valid;
Next i;
5.4. Some number theoretical open questions motivated by attacks on
PLWE. As seen before, being simultaneously Galois and monogenic, having α =
1 as a root of the minimal polynomial modulo q (or some other root of small order)
and the non-smearing under the evaluation map πα of the set of small vecotrs in
Pq can be regarded as weakness conditions to build a RLWE-based cryptosystem.
We give next a list of number theoretical problems which are motivated by the
search of security in RLWE-based primitives and are still open, up to date.
Question 5.12. Are there fields of cryptographic size (i.e. n ≥ 210) which are
Galois and monogenic, other than the cyclotomic number fields and their maximal
real subfields? How can one construct such fields explicitly? Is it possible to test
algorithmically both features?
Notice that for fields of cryptographic size, the discriminant is too big to test
whether or not it is square free, hence to decide if it is monogenic. An algorithmic
approach which circumvects this testing is not available at the time of writing.
Although for fields of small degree, a complete characterisation may be feasible
(sufficient and necessary conditions for a cubic number field have been found by
Gras and Archinard), the situation is much different for large degree fields. For
instance, cyclic extensions tend to be non-monogenic:
Theorem 5.13. Any cyclic extension K of prime degree n ≥ 5 is non-monogenic
except for the maximal real subfield of the (2l + 1)-th cyclotomic field.
RING LEARNING WITH ERRORS 21
Another result in this direction is as follows:
Theorem 5.14. Let n ≥5 be relatively prime to 2, 3. There are only finitely
many abelian number fields of degree n that are monogenic.
Question 5.15. Let α be a root of f(x) modulo q. For which subsets S ⊆ Rq it
is πα(S) = Fq?
Or, at least, can one determine the conditions for non-smearing, like in the
case when α = 1 and S is a set of small vectors in Pq?
Finally, as seen before, polynomials with small order roots modulo q should be
avoided. Again, cyclotomic polynomials are safe for attacks built on small order
roots, as their roots have maximal order. The problem here is as follows:
Question 5.16. For random polynomials f(x) and random primes q for which
f(x) has a root α modulo q, what can one say about the order of α modulo q?
A special instance of this question is this famous open problem:
Problem 5.17. For given a ∈ Z, how often is a a primitive root modulo q as q
runs over the primes?
A conjecture by Artin states that a is a primitive root modulo q for infinitely
many primes q such that a is not a perfect square or −1 modulo q. Moreover,
the conjecture describes the density of such primes.
6. Beyond encryption and some NIST figures
6.1. RLWE Digital Signatures. We focus here in the most recent RLWE dig-
ital signature scheme, the GLYPH ([5] 2017), which improves an earlier scheme
by Gunyesu,Lyubashevsky and Poppelman (GLP). This and other RLWE-based
signatures schemes have the smallest public keys and signature sizes among
postquantum digital signature schemes.
A first difference to mention here is that instead of discrete Gaussians, the co-
efficients of small polynomials are sampled uniformly from {−b, ..., 0, ..., b} with
|b| ≪ q. Secondly, the lengths of signatures must not exceed a prescribed param-
eter n, regardless of the size of the message to sign. To attain this, the scheme
uses a hash function H, which takes arbitrary messages to bit strings of length
n. Third, the procedure has a sampling rejection step: if the infinity norm of a
signature polynomial exceeds a fixed bound, β, that polynomial will be discarded
and the signing process starts again. This process will be repeated until the infin-
ity norm of the signature polynomial is less than or equal the bound. Rejection
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ensures that the output signature is not exploitably correlated with the signer’s
secret key values. In GLYPH, the bound, β will be (b−k), where k is the number
of non-zero coefficients allowed in acceptable polynomials.
Last, the maximum degree of the signature polynomials will be n−1 and there-
fore have n coefficients. Typical values for n are 512, and 1024. The coefficients
of these polynomials will be taken from the field Fq where q is an odd prime
congruent to 1 mod 4. For n = 1024, GLYPH sets q = 59393, b = 16383 and
k = 16. The scheme is as follows:
1. Key generation:
1.1 Generate two polynomials s(x) and e(x) with coefficients chosen uni-
formly from the set {−b, ...− 1, 0, 1, ..., b}. The pair (s(x), e(x)) is the
private key.
1.2 Compute t(x) = a(x)s(x) + e(x), with a(x) chosen uniformly at
random. The public key is (a(x), t(x)).
2. Signature generation:
2.1 Generate two small polynomials y1(x) and y2(x).
2.2 Compute w(x) = a(x)y1(x) + y2(x).
2.3 Map w(x) into a bit string ω.
2.4 Compute c(x) = H(ω||m). The || denotes concatenation of strings.
2.5 Compute z1(x) = s(x)c(x) + y1(x) and z2(x) = e(x)c(x) + y2(x).
2.6 While the infinity norms of z1(x) or z2(x) is greater than β go to
step 2.1.
2.7 The signature is the triple of (c(x), z1(x), z2(x)). Transmit the signa-
ture along with the message m(x). Notice that we are not discussing
here signatures of encrypted messages, which is a more sophisticated
cryptographic functionality.
3. Signature verification:
3.1 Verify that the infinity norms of z1(x) and z2(x) do not exceed β. If
not, reject the signature.
3.2 Compute w′(x) = a(x)z1(x) + z2(x)− t(x)c(x).
3.3 Map w′(x) into a bit string ω′.
3.4 Compute c′(x) = H(ω′||m).
3.5 If c′(x) 6= c(x) reject the signature, otherwise accept the signature
as valid.
Notice that a(x)z1(x)+z2(x)−t(x)c(x) = w(x), hence c′(x) = c(x) if the signature
is not tampered, hence the scheme is correct.
6.2. RLWE Homomorphic encryption. Although homomorphic encryption
was first introduced by Rivest, Adleman and Shamir back in the 70’s, it was first
constructed by Craig Gentry in 2009 in its seminal paper [10]. The possibility of
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cheap cloud computing and distributed storage have drastically changed how busi-
ness and individuals process their data and although traditional encryption like
AES are very fast, to perform even simple analytics on encrypted data requires
either the cloud server to access the secret keys, leading to security concerns
or to download the data, decrypt and operate, which is costly. Homomorphic
encryption is the solution to this challenge.
Areas where homomorphic encryption has applications include electronic vot-
ing systems and processing or computing on encrypted or compressed health,
financial or other kinds of sensitive data on external servers like cloud or dis-
tributed devices.
Homomorphic and fully homomorphic encryption(FHE) has already been in-
troduced here in Definition 2.5, and Example 2.6 provides an example of non-fully
homomorphic encryption scheme. RLWE provides a FHE scheme, as we see next.
Definition 6.1 (The BGV cryptosystem ([4])). Denote R = Z[x]/(Φm(x)), with
Φm(x) the m-th cyclotomic polynomial and RN := R/NR. Consider as the space
of plaintexts the ring Rpr , for fixed r. The scheme is parametrized by a sequence
of decreasing moduli qL > qL−1 > ... > q0 such that qi ≤ min
{√
qi+1,
qi+1
2
}
and
an i-th level ciphertext is a vector v ∈ Rqi .
1. Key generation: Chose s ∈ R by sampling from a discrete Gaussian such
that the probability of the set {0,±1}φ(m) is close enough to 1.
2. Encryption/Decryption: A plaintext α ∈ Rpr is encrypted to E(s, α) =
(p0, p1) ∈ Rqi if and only if p0 + sp1 modulo qi equals α + prǫ in R with
||ǫ|| < qi/pr for some i ∈ {0, ..., L}.
Observe that adding or multiplying two i-level ciphertexts results in an i+ 1-
level ciphertext, so computations over level L-ciphertexts are not allowed, as
they cannot be decrypted. Several recent refinements to this scheme have been
proposed ([11]) and the topic is still under research.
Several open-source implementations of homomorphic encryption are available.
For instance, HELib, a widely used library from IBM that implements the BGV
cryptosystem, SEAL, a Microsoft version, ΛOλ (pronounced LOL), a Haskell li-
brary for ring-based lattice cryptography that supports FHE or PALISADE, a
general lattice encryption library. it is possible to add new implementations af-
ter public review by contacting contact@HomomorphicEncryption.org. In sum,
homomorphic encryption is already ripe for mainstream use but the lack of stan-
dardisation makes difficult to start using it.
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6.3. NIST figures. In 2017, the American National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), opened an open process to solicit, evaluate, and standardize
one or more quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms. In their own
words:
The question of when a large-scale quantum computer will be built is a com-
plicated one. While in the past it was less clear that large quantum computers
are a physical possibility, many scientists now believe it to be merely a significant
engineering challenge. Some engineers even predict that within the next twenty
or so years sufficiently large quantum computers will be built to break essentially
all public key schemes currently in use. Historically, it has taken almost two
decades to deploy our modern public key cryptography infrastructure. Therefore,
regardless of whether we can estimate the exact time of the arrival of the quantum
computing era, we must begin now to prepare our information security systems
to be able to resist quantum computing.
The deadline for submission was November 30, 2017. The total number of
submissions (for encryption, key exchange and signatures) was 71. At the time
of writing, 14 submissions have been attacked or withdrawn (due to an attack
or the finding of a fatal mistake by the authors). Of the remaining 57, some of
the proposals (mainly code-based ones) have merged. Taking this into account,
50 proposals remain unbroken. Some of them have been found to have non-fatal
statistical attacks, which can be avoided with a right choice of parameters.
Now, of these 50 proposals: 9 are code-based, 21 are lattice-based, 2 are hash-
based (and both have been found to have non-fatal attacks or there are parameter
concerns), 9 are multivariate-based, 1 is a supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman
(SIDH) key-exchange protocol, which has a potential attack. The remaining 8
submissions are hybrid or are based on problems such as random walks (1), braids
(2), Chebychev polynomials (1) or hypercomplex numbers (1).
Finally, in the lattice-based category, 15 are RLWE-based. Of these 15, 2 of
them are PLWE-based. For details cf. https://www.safecrypto.eu/pqclounge/
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